CRM Knowledge Base
The theory behind the reflex.
Ten concepts. Read them before the scenarios. Return to them after the debrief.
Concepts · 04
Speaking Up
What it is
Speaking up is the deliberate act of raising a concern, flagging an error, or challenging a decision in the cockpit. It sounds simple. In practice it is one of the most consistently underdeveloped skills in aviation CRM, appearing as a contributing factor in a disproportionate number of accidents and serious incidents.
Why it happens
The barrier to speaking up is not knowledge — pilots know they should raise concerns. The barrier is social. Speaking up risks being wrong, risks irritating a senior colleague, risks being seen as the first officer who never stops talking. These social costs are not imaginary. They are real features of cockpit culture in many airlines. They do not disappear because a training course said to challenge authority. They require a specific, rehearsed habit to override.
In the cockpit
You see a navigational discrepancy in the FMS. You are 20 minutes from top of descent. The captain is relaxed. Nothing is urgent. You think about saying something and then think about how to say it and then think about whether you have read it correctly and then decide to monitor it for a few more minutes. The few minutes pass. The descent begins. The window closes.
The counter-reflex
Remove the decision of whether to speak from the moment of speaking. Adopt a standing rule: any discrepancy I can identify, I raise within 60 seconds of identifying it. The rule replaces the in-the-moment social calculation with a pre-committed habit. The words are always the same: "Captain, I need you to look at something."
From the reports
Composite patterns from public EASA, AAIB, BEA, and NTSB occurrence data.
OCCURRENCE PATTERN
A first officer conducting pre-flight preparation identified an MEL entry that appeared to be referenced incorrectly by maintenance in the technical log. He did not raise the discrepancy before departure, stating post-event that he had been uncertain whether his reading of the MEL was correct and had not wanted to delay the flight if he was wrong. An engineering inspection following an inflight ECAM advisory confirmed the MEL had been misapplied. The investigating body noted the first officer's pre-departure identification of the potential discrepancy as a missed intervention opportunity.
Pattern composite — public occurrence database [EASA]
CRM finding: Speaking Up — Self-silencing before departure